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ABSTRACT 
Security problems in collaboration work are less well understood than those in the business and defence 
worlds. Earlier work in the medical area in Britain has highlighted some of the principles involved but 
has neglected some important areas. Most of the security models developed to date are inadequate in the 
collaboration area. We develop a perspective for policies and models that is task-based on a need-to-
know basis. These policies can be represented as Petri nets to identify the functions and states involved. 
We have also developed a general architecture for a secure collaborative environment. An example is 
given of the application of our techniques to a problem involving negotiation, decision and agreement in 
a collaboration environment.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Information about an individual is absolutely secure, as long as nobody else has access to it, which is 
true only in the case where an individual is completely independent. As a consequence information is 
naturally sharable among groups such as team, committee, organization, country and federation in a 
manner based on trust. However to achieve an accepted level of trust is quite a complicated issue 
because as the collaboration grows wider, more participants are involved with divergent policies. 
Although designing secure models for collaboration environments has been a target of a number of 
academic and commercial research and several works have been done (both theoretical and practical), 
still numerous organizations keep their systems (especially the trusted systems) unconnected with 
outsiders.  
Basically security systems are built out of the available mechanisms to meet a security policy based on a 
selected security model [10]. The Bell-Lapadula Model (BLP) was the first formal model [4]. It is a state 
machine capturing the confidentiality aspect of the access control. It has been considered as a base or (at 
least a benchmark) for most security models and is used to design most of the available operating 
systems to support access control. Security policy in BLP is based on security levels and an access 
control matrix, which supports the traditional access rights (read, write, execute, append) but not the 
more recent access rights such as those required in a collaboration environment (viewing, coupling) 
[16]. However BLP deals only with confidentiality, not with the other computer security aspects such as 
integrity and does not address the management of access control as well as it has been proven that BLP 
could contain a convert channel1. To conclude the BLP model is suitable for an environment where 
polices are static.  
                                                                
1 Convert channel is an information flow that is not controlled by security mechanisms. 
Subsequent models attempted to fill the gaps left open in BLP. For instance the Harrison-Ruzzon-
Ullman Model (HRU) [11] defines an authorisation system to address the problem of changing access 
rights, which was not addressed in BLP. In contrast to BLP, where access rights are usually assumed to 
be static, in the Chinese Wall Model [6] the access rights have to be re-examined at every state 
transition, to avoid conflict of interest. The Biba Model [5] deals with the integrity aspect. The Clark-
Wilson Model [8] considers security requirements for commercial applications. It has two mechanisms 
to enforce integrity: the well-formed transaction and the separation of duties. The Information-Flow 
Model deals with the problem of the convert channel that has not been addressed by BLP and considers 
a system as a secure system if there is no illegal information flow. It should be noted that the above 
models are similar structurally. 
Most of the security models that were designed subsequently were targeted at a specific security 
requirement. For instance multi-agency services and collaboration networks are based to some extent on 
these general models. However all these models are dealing with a single policy, whereas by definition 
the multi-agency and collaboration environment involves more than one policy.  
A motivating example of an application that involves multi-agency services is the medical information 
services. The only model designed to meet the confidentiality requirements for the medical records in 
the UK was the BMA (British Medical Association) Security Policy Model [3]. This model was recently 
examined [2] against the multi-agency security requirements and it was found that the issue of sharing 
clinical information including collaboration activities with other agencies such as police, social services 
or the education authority was not considered for policy reasons. For instance the need-to-know problem 
was not addressed in the BMA model, as the BMA does not accept that need-to-know is an acceptable 
basis for access control decisions. However there might be a case where need-to-know cannot be 
avoided. For instance a service provider such as an insurance company offers its services conditioned by 
some information about the patient who applies for such services. An example is given in [2].  
In this paper, we propose a security model that we argue will alleviate the security difficulties that may 
arise in attempts to build a collaboration network. The model is constructed from a task-based 
perspective, as this approach seems to offer the best way forward, as discussed later. The general 
principles of the model are discussed and a diagrammatic representation is devised. Two task-based 
collaboration protocols, expressed in this paper in the form of Petri Nets, represent the permitted states 
and transitions. An example of informal collaboration is used to illustrate the application of the model.  
2. A TASK-BASED PERSPECTIVE FOR COLLABORATION NETWORKS 
A collaboration business, by definition, is based on the needs of the collaborators from each other. Each 
side needs information or a service from the other participants. The obvious question that someone will 
immediately ask before he/she releases any confidential information or responds to an enquiry is: What 
for? For what purpose is the information required? Usually the expected answer will be the naming of a 
task for which the information required is essential, sometimes with a further explanation of the benefit 
of this task for the two sides (collaboration proposal). The information owner may like to restrict the use 
of this information by some conditions (security policy). If they reach initial agreement a detailed 
negotiation will then take place until they reach a considered level of trust, which leads to a 
collaboration agreement to perform the task. One reasonable condition might be to limit the use of the 
information by other tasks. For instance it could be specified that the information should not be used 
outside the task for any purpose. 
We have decided to build our model as a task-oriented model [1] for the following reasons:  
1. Fundamentally any collaboration scheme is based on specific tasks: there is no collaboration 
without a task.  
2. The task-based approach is promising to address the need-to-know problem, satisfying a user 
requirement in any multi-agency services environment. 
3. The collaboration task is the common object between the collaborators.  
4. Shared information ownership can be granted to the collaboration task.  
5. The task is scalable, flexible and dynamic.  
6. Explicit responsibility is recognized in the task-based approach.  
Overall the basis for any collaboration is an aim to share resources in order to achieve common benefits 
by performing shared operations. Other task-based approaches to security are discussed later. 
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR OUR MODEL 
3.1 Collaboration 
 In our model we consider any deal/trade between individuals or groups which aims to benefit the sides 
involved is a kind of collaboration. The following are some forms of collaboration: 
• Trading between customers and service providers. 
• Joint operation projects 
• Research group collaboration. 
• The clinician and the patient trade/relationship: the clinician's job exists because of the patient, and 
the patient needs the clinician for treatment. So both need each other and benefit each other. The 
clinician may need to know some information from the patient as part of the course of treatment. 
The relationship is in general based on trust. In this example there are two sides trading benefits 
through the task called treatment.   
3.2 Ownership  
The ownership is considered as a political issue and it is not only difficult to model but even difficult to 
define who own what. The following ownership aspects need to be understood well:  
1. Right to own: fundamentally according to the general principles of freedom and human rights 
such as the General Declaration of Human rights 1948 an individual or group reserve the right to 
own their properties including personal information.  
2. Ownership limitation: nevertheless an individual ownership is occasionally limited for the 
community/nation’s benefit. 
3. Regulation effect: granting or limiting the ownership is based on regulation by the law.  
4. Ownership delegation: to meet the law and regulation requirements the ownership can be 
delegated but only under explicit principles and for a specific purpose.  
 An item of information, in this model, is owned initially by its natural owner that is the person to whom 
the information relates. For instance information about the baby is owned by the baby although this 
information is controlled by guardian/parents. In computer security terms this is called grant access or 
delegation. Once this information is required to be shared among collaboration parties, an access will be 
granted to what we call the collaboration-task and will be controlled by the task-policy. The information 
owner and/or the access controller will be part of the negotiation that results in the task policy. 
3.3 Authorization  
A participant in a collaboration network, called task-participant, will be authorised to gain access to a 
collaboration-task. This authority will be limited by what we call task-policy.  
3.4 Responsibilities 
All responsibilities should be explicitly defined in the task policy in the way each individual 
collaborator (task-participant) knows their responsibilities such as the required duties, the rules to 
follow (including ethical codes), the limitations (e.g. time, use of material and information) and the 
penalties. 
4. COLLABORATION TASK CHARACTERISTICS  
The following properties are required for a collaboration task:  
1. Flexible:  can be a single activity or group of activities sharing same policy, each of which can be 
selected as the need arises.  
2. Dynamic: can be updated even while it is running (supporting post-hoc justification). For instance a 
nurse can be replaced by another one if he/she is not, for any reason, able to complete his/her duty in 
a surgical operation. However any change in the task elements should be fully and carefully 
documented. (Accountability).  
3. Secure: should be appropriately protected using all the available mechanisms. 
4. Scalable: can be upgraded, for instance to fill some gaps in the original one. A new collaboration 
task can be built starting from default tasks (task template).  
5. Accountable: all collaboration protocol states and all task run-time events of the collaboration must 
be well documented. 
5. DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF MODEL  
The architecture in Figure 1 illustrates the general components of our model. The main component is the 
collaborators (two or more), each of which will need to define three elements: requirements (what does 
he/she/it/they aim to gain from the other side), policy (rules that need to be obeyed) and material (e.g. 
information to release or services to offer). The second component is a pair of task-based collaboration 
protocols -- the Collaboration Task Creation Protocol (CTCP) and the Collaboration Task Runtime 
Protocol (CTRP), both detailed later in the following sections. 
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Figure 1: general architecture for secure 
collaboration environment 
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CTCP includes a negotiation between all collaborators where the proposed task will be discussed 
including all collaborators’ policies and requirements. This process (negotiation) continues until a 
decision is taken either by rejecting the proposal or by accepting it. The acceptance of a proposal will 
lead to a formal agreement/contract, which will produce the proposed collaboration task in its final stage 
including all of the policies and requirements.  Negotiation can of course be a very complex task [7]. 
The work described here could be extended later to include such aspects as conflict resolution. CTRP 
will start after a successful compilation of CTCP and as scheduled in the task_policy (not necessarily 
immediately after the end of CTCP). 
The main function of CTRP is to process the task that was previously created by the CTCP protocol and 
ensure that the task_policy is obeyed, the collaborators are aware of the circumstances and the right 
action is taken. CTRP is detailed in the following sections. In a special case of the abnormal termination 
of the task process the collaborators may need to go back to the CTCP protocol to create an alternative 
task. It should be noted that the task_participants (collaborators) are not necessarily to be the same 
subjects who were participating in the CTCP. However that should be included in the task_policy. The 
case of an emergency update for the participants list during the CTRP will be covered by the CTRP 
process documentation (the CTRP log) 
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6. FORMALISATION OF PROTOCOLS 
We use the Petri Nets model to represent our collaboration protocols to provide a formal basis and to 
make it more readable for computer scientists. Flow charts lack a formal basis and can be ambiguous in 
representing states and transitions. Net theory was originally introduced in a PhD thesis of C. A. Petri 
and Reisig [15] introduced it to the software engineering area in 1985. More recent advances in this 
formalism are described in [14]. The usefulness of Petri Nets in providing a theoretical basis for 
handling object life cycles has been demonstrated by Van Der Aalst and Basten  [20]. The Petri Net in 
Figure 2 represents the CTCP protocol.  
The initial state represents the aim of each collaborator including requirements, policies and offers. For 
instance, in the patient-doctor collaboration, the patient’s requirements are treatments, the patient’s 
policy is to keep personal information secret, the doctor’s requirements may include information about 
the patient and the doctor’s offer is a treatment course. These aspects will be initially discussed as to 
whether the task (at first an offer from one side or a requirement from another) is accepted as an offer or 
rejected without any further details. The introduction transition will not include discussion about the 
policies. If the proposed task is found to be reasonable then all collaborators will enter into a detailed 
negotiation in which all aspects including requirements, services and polices will be clarified for all 
collaborators. After that one of three decisions will be taken: the first option could be that one of the 
collaborators needs more time to think about the task/offer; the second option could be that the expected 
level of trust could not be ensured so the task is simply dismissed; the third option is that all 
collaborators trust each others so that an agreement between all collaborators will take place. This 
agreement at the end will be formulated in what we call the collaboration task. This task will be limited 
in scope by the task policy, which is a composition of all collaborators' policies, meeting all sides’ 
requirements. 
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Figure 3: Petri Nets Graph representing the 
Collaboration Task Run-time Protocol (CTRP) 
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The Task Runtime protocol (CTRP), illustrated in Figure 3, starts after the task has been completely 
created by the CTCP protocol and when its schedule time, according to the task-policy, is due. Before 
starting the process of the task some tasks need some preparations. Then the task process starts 
following the policy that has been approved in the CTCP stage. Each state of this process is monitored, 
assessed (verified against the task-policy) and then documented. The task assessment may result in one 
of the following:  
1. The task is proceeding satisfactorily, following the policy and the plan and has not finished yet, 
so the task should persist.  
2. The task needs an update to meet its requirements. Depending on how the updates affect the 
process: the task may restart or continue from the last state of the process.  
3. The task reaches its scheduled end, hence the task terminates normally.  
4. There might be a case where the task abnormally terminates, for instance the task-policy has 
been violated, or the task exceeds the scheduled time without valid reasons. The abnormal 
termination could lead either to the end of the task and then of the collaboration or to a new 
session of the CTCP. 
7. EXAMPLE OF INFORMAL COLLABORATION 
Let us consider a situation of a son asking his father for some cash: 
7.1 The Collaboration Task Creation protocol (CTCP) 
7.1.1 Introduction:  
Son: father, I need 20 pounds [requirements]. 
Father: what for? 
Son: to buy a book. [Purpose] 
Father: well I do not have enough cash and I cannot drive to the ATM at the moment. [Initial discussion] 
Son: Would you please lend me any of your cards (Debit or Credit) with the PIN, so I can go myself? 
[Proposed task] 
7.1.2 Negotiation:  
Father: well, you understand that you will not use this card for any other purpose, you will not withdraw 
more than 20 pounds, and you will not give away the card or its PIN to anybody else [Policy]. 
Son: Yes, I do understand that [accepting policy]. 
7.1.3 Decision: 
Father based on his experience with his son will go for one of the following three options:  
1. Take more time to think about the matter and to ask more questions. [Back to negotiation], 
2. Cannot trust his son, so he cannot give him his card. [Dismiss the task], or 
3. Trust his son and give him the card [commit the task]. 
7.1.4 Agreement:  
• Father: I agree to give you my card along with the PIN but you should remember that:  
• You return the card to me within 20 minutes of obtaining the money. 
• You will not withdraw more than 20 pounds and you will not use the card for any other purpose. 
• You will use the money to buy a book. 
• You should not give the card nor disclose the PIN to anybody else. 
• This agreement is based on trust between us. 
• Son: Yes, I do understand all these conditions. 
7.1.3 Rejection: 
Father: I will go myself later to obtain for you the money that you want. 
Figure 5: Petri Net representing the CTCP of the given example 
Introduction= {Son's requirements = “20 pounds cash”, 
                       Purpose = “to buy a book”,  
                       Proposed task = “borrow credit/debit card"} 
Agreement {son can get the card, obey the policy, 
punishment would never get such help in the future}  
Decision= trustworthy or not 
Create Col-task 
Trust 
Mistrust 
Negotiation: Father’s policy ={withdraw only 20 pounds, 
not to use the card for any other purpose, return the card 
after getting the money, not to give it away } 
Discard={father may go 
himself to get the money} 
Rethinking 
7.2 The Collaboration Task Runtime Protocol (CTRP). 
7.2.1 Preparation: 
Farther: Explains to his son how to use the card and gives it to him. 
7.2.2 Task process: 
Son takes the card and starts using it. 
7.2.3 Task assessment: 
Father watches the time, maybe checks his account with another card if it takes more time than expected 
and takes decisions accordingly. Meanwhile he updates his relationship of trust with his son in the light 
of this experience. 
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Figure 6: Petri Net representing the CTRP of the given Example  
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1> Father decides to send his 
daughter to follow his son. 
2> Son brings the card back and gets 
only £20. 
3> It takes more time than it requires 
 
7.3 Example modelling: 
In this example we have two collaborators (task-participant1=son and task-paticipant2=father), 
task_name = borrow credit/debit card, purpose = withdraw 20 pounds to buy a book, policy = 
{withdraw only 20 pounds, not to use the card for any other purpose, return the card after getting the 
money, and not to give it away}, and security-base = {trust based on experience}. A Petri Net graph 
in Figure 5 represents this example in the CTCP layer/stage and Figure 6 represents it in the CTRP 
layer. 
   
8. DISCUSSION 
We consider two aspects of our work. Firstly the extent to which task-based approaches have been used 
before in security systems; secondly the usability and computability of task-based approaches in the 
security area. 
The idea of task-based has been introduced before in a number of models [9],[17], [18]. All were at the 
basic level of this approach. The focus in [17, 18] was on whether a task-based security model could be 
an alternative authorisation and access control model to the subject-object traditional authorisation 
models. While in [9] Fischer-Hubner and Ott tried to address the privacy problem using the task-based 
approach.  We intend in our model to use all of the power of this idea (task-based approach) to address 
the security problem of the collaboration networks and the multi-agency services environment. In more 
detail: 
1. Steinke [17] outlines the general features and characteristics of the task-based approaches such as: 
• The need-to-know is related to the operation, which needs to be performed. 
• Any information needs can be related to a task. 
• Tasks are common entities that exist and relate directly to both users and to information. 
• Tasks limit the access to the information from the start to the termination of the tasks. 
• Tasks already exist, and are identifiable, flexible and dynamic. 
The Group Security model (GSM) by Steinke was described as a security model, which provides access 
to information on the base of a user's task. 
However some features of GSM are already rather obvious in existing information systems 
infrastructure. For instance in any relational database, it is always possible to grant users/roles to 
functions, procedures, and packages rather than grant them to the information objects (e.g. tables, 
views). These functions, procedures and packages are in fact tasks and group of tasks and also can be 
functionally minimized. GSM considers the discretionary security approach to deal with ownership. 
Overall GSM is more suitable for hierarchy systems, where the responsibilities are visible.  
2. Thomas and Sandhu [18] introduced the task-based approach initially in 1994 as an approach to 
address integrity issues in computerized information systems from an enterprise perspective. 
Subsequently in 1997 they [19] developed their approach to produce a paradigm for access control 
and authorisation management. The developed model is called Task-based authorisation control 
TBAC.   
3. Fischer-Hubner and Ott [9] in their model attempted to address the privacy aspect using the task-
based approach. The nature of the task-based approach eases the handling of the main privacy 
requirements such as: 
• Purpose binding: personal data obtained for one purpose should not be used for another purpose 
without informed consent. 
• Necessity of data collection and processing: the collection and processing of personal data shall 
only be allowed, if it is necessary for tasks falling within the responsibility of the data processing 
agency.  
In contrast to the models of Steinke and of Thomas and Sandhu, this model takes a forward step to 
de-centralise the authorisation using a 4-eyes principle. However there were no end-user 
requirements supporting this model and the 4-eyes principle is not enough to ensure de-
centralisation. The set theory which was used to represent this model is not proven, nor is it in a 
framework (Petri nets, Category theory, LaSCO, Ponder, VDM, Z, ...) where proof is done by 
following constructive principles or through following rules guaranteeing a particular outcome. 
Finally the Fischer-Hübner and Ott model does not include collaboration ventures.  
4. Mahling, Coury and Croft [13], 11 years ago, tried to build a task-based collaboration model. 
However this work starts from a relatively late stage in the negotiation where the plan, agreement 
and tasks are relatively clear. In addition their work does not consider the case of the multi-agency 
environments where the policies of the collaborators are different.  
We argue that the real challenge for the task-based approach is the multi-agency services environment, 
where responsibilities are distributed and the ownership is dynamic.  None of the existing approaches 
have considered the multi-agency aspects in detail.  Furthermore the other issue of any computer system 
design including security system is the usability [12]. This issue was ignored in most of the above 
security models.  
Usability and computability are almost equally important issues. It is not sufficient for a computer 
system to be robust, dependable, and cover all the expected functions (computability). It also has to be 
accepted by its users, in other words it has to be user-friendly (usability). Social specialists and some 
groups of information and computer specialists argue that the issue of “usability” has more to do with 
developments and implementations of computer systems than their computability. Certainly the 
computer security issue is not an exception from this rule. Indeed usability factors such as politics, 
organization policy and rules, human behaviours and modes, groups and individuals’ interests are very 
much involved in the design of a secure computer system. For instance a long and difficult security 
procedure may affect the system availability and/or encourage users to skip some steps of the procedure.  
In addition to its coverage of the issue of computability, our model will also suitably fulfill the usability 
requirements since it considers direct participation of the users. For example it is not necessary, in our 
task-based model, to fully computerize a given task; it depends very much on the result of the 
negotiation between the involved parties in that task. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has introduced a task-based model to facilitate collaboration in trusted multi-agency 
networks, after a wide investigation of the exiting security models concerning the multi-agency 
environment and collaboration networks. Our model is based on the fundamental aspect of the 
collaboration environment, which is the task-based perspective. Two task-based collaboration protocols 
(CTCP and CTRP), expressed in this paper in the form of Petri Nets, are used to represent the permitted 
states and transitions. An example of informal collaboration is used to illustrate the application of the 
model. We have also discussed the extent to which task-based approaches have been used before in 
security systems. In addition to its coverage of the area of computability, our model suitably covers the 
usability requirements.  
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